The present article investigates the possibility of designing zero-knowledge identication schemes based on hard problems from coding theory. Zero-knowledge proofs were introduced in 1985, in a paper by Goldwasser, Micali and Racko ( 16]). Their practical signi cance was soon demonstrated in the work of Fiat and Shamir ( 11]), who turned zero-knowledge proofs of quadratic residuosity into e cient means of establishing user identities. In the present paper, we propose a new identi cation scheme, based on error-correcting codes, which is zero-knowledge and seems of practical value. Furthermore, we describe several variants, including one which has an identity based character. The security of our schemes depends on the hardness of nding a word of given syndrome and prescribed (small) weight with respect to some randomly generated binary linear error-correcting code. This is, of course, not the rst attempt to design a cryptographic scheme using tools from coding theory. The di erence is that identi cation protocols do not follow the public key paradigm based on trap-door functions and described in the seminal Di e-Hellman paper ( 8]). Rather, they only require one-way functions, which opens the way to using, in a rather direct manner, simple combinatorial problems of the kind provided by coding theory. The resulting schemes compare favourably to their number-theoretic analogues.
Introduction
Modern cryptography is concerned with algorithms and schemes which ensure con dentiality, integrity and proof of origin for digital communications. In conventional cryptosystems, these various functionalities are provided in a setting where the transmitter and the receiver share a common key, whose secrecy is requested for proper operation. A major breakthrough took place in 1976 with the appearance of public-key cryptography ( 8] ). In their paper, Di e and Hellman proposed a new concept, allowing the use of two matching keys, one for encryption and a di erent one for decryption. The main novel character of the concept is that the encryption key need not be kept secret. Shortly afterwards, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman invented the celebrated RSA algorithm ( 29] ). This algorithm is a public key system making heavy use of operations modulo a large integer n obtained by multiplying together two prime numbers and whose security is related to di culty of factoring n. Since then, nearly all new cryptographic schemes have been based on hard problems from number 1 The underlying hard problem As was mentioned in the introduction, an identi cation scheme uses a speci c one-way function. Actually, a one way-function is not a mere function but a family of functions f n , depending on an integer n, which is usually thought as a security parameter. In order to simplify matters, we will always assume that the domain D n of f n is such that, for suitable strictly increasing functions k(n) and l(n), l(n) k(n), D n is included in f0; 1g l(n) and is the image of f0; 1g k(n) by a one-to-one polynomial-time function. This is a particular case of what is called polynomially-samplable. Note that our conventions imply that for n 6 = m, D n and D m are disjoint.
De nition 1 A collection of functions ff n : D n 7 ! f0; 1g r(n) g is called strongly one-way if the following two conditions hold: i)there exists a polynomial-time algorithm F that, on input x 2 D n , always outputs f n (x).
ii) for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, every c > 0 and all su ciently large n's, Pr(A(f n (X n )) 2 f ?1 n (f n (X n ))) < 1 n c where X n is a random variable uniformly distributed over D n .
Remark. Our notation possibly needs explanation: f ?1 n applied to some value y refers to the set of all pre-images of y.
Of course, the practical relevance of the above de nition is questionable as is the meaning of proofs based on it. In practice, we have only constants and not parameters going to in nity. This opens up a whole potential discussion on the role of complexity-based arguments in cryptography and is not speci c to the scheme presented here nor to the theorems proved in order to assess its security. There are various ways to answer this objection. Firstly, we may argue, based on experiments, that the asymptotics are actually relevant in the proposed range of parameters. This is what is usually done for schemes based e.g. on the hardness of factoring and parameters for these schemes are nely tuned, taking into account the latest progress of factoring algorithms. We will develop similar argument for our scheme further down in the present section. Secondly, we may view complexity-theoretic proofs as a mere technique to validate the design of cryptographic protocols: with this modest approach, schemes that are supported by some type of mathematical proof receive some evidence that their design is not awed but the word proof cannot be applied without precaution to the practical implementations. Finally, we may use a speci c lower bound on the security of the concrete one-way function under consideration. Accordingly, the reductions used in the proofs have to be analyzed for precise running time and lowering of the security. Since it entails extra technical and notational di culties we have chosen not to systematically undertake this kind of analysis in a paper aimed at a large audience and to keep it for future work.
We now turn to error-correcting codes. An (n; k; d) binary linear code is a linear subspace of f0; 1g n of dimension k, whose non zero elements have weight at least d. Here, f0; 1g n is viewed as a vector space over the two-element eld, with the usual bitwise addition and scalar multiplication. Members of f0; 1g n are sometimes called words and the (Hamming)
weight of a word x, denoted by w H (x) is the number of ones it includes. The information rate of an (n; k; d) binary linear code is the ratio k=n and the code can correct up to j d?1 2 k errors, where btc denotes, as usual, the integer part of a real number t. An (n; k; d) binary linear code can also be de ned by its parity check matrix which is an m-by-n binary matrix (m = n ? k), with the property that, for each vector of the code, the product (mod 2) of the matrix by the vector is zero. In the matrix vector product, the element of the code is a column vector and lies on the right of the matrix. Actually, this product can be computed for any vector and is called the syndrome. If the vector is not in the code, the syndrome is non zero. It is well known that the question of nding the closest codeword to a vector is hard. It is also di cult to nd a word of given weight from its syndrome's value (see 2]). More precisely, the following problem, stated in the style of 12], is NP-complete:
Instance An m n binary matrix H = (h ij ), a binary non-zero vector y = (y 1 ; : : : ; y m ), and a positive integer w.
Question Is there a binary vector x = (x 1 ; : : :; x n ) with no more than w 1's such that, for 1 i m, P n j=1 h ij x j y i (mod 2) ? Comment: The variant in which we ask for an x with exactly w 1's is NP-complete, even for y = (0; 0; : : : ; 0). If we drop the word \exactly", the question becomes open.
NP-completeness ensures that there is no polynomial-timealgorithm for solving a problem in the worst case; however many NP-complete problems can be attacked after a suitable preprocessing phase or can be suitably approximated or else can be e ciently solved on average. The rst issue has been discussed in a related work of Bruck and Naor ( 5] ), where they present a linear code, such that even with a large amount of pre-processing (based on the parity matrix only), it is still hard to produce a minimum-weight word leading to this syndrome. Non-approximability results for the minimum distance of a code appear in 1]. As for the the hardness of random instances, the question has been investigated by various researchers, especially for families of random codes with a constant information rate. Such codes can be obtained by randomly lling up a parity check matrix of the appropriate dimension with zeros and ones. It is known that these codes almost surely satisfy the GilbertVarshamov bound ( 23] ) and therefore that they can correct a constant fraction of the length of the codewords. More accurately, we let = k=n and we de ne a function = GV ( ) by the relation 1 ? = H 2 ( ), with 0 < < 1=2 and H 2 (x) = ?x log 2 x ? (1 ? x) log 2 (1 ? x).
Then, for any < , random codes with information rate almost surely decode j n 2 k errors.
Still, it is di cult do decode with respect to these codes and it even looks equally hard to exhibit codewords achieving the minimum distance or to nd words of given syndrome whose weight is close to the minimumdistance. Several probabilistic algorithms have been proposed that solve these problems (see 19, 34, 6] ) but their running time is exponential. In practical terms, it appears relatively easy to design e cient probabilistic algorithms which nd words of very low weight and given syndrome, and similarly for words of average weight, but the probability of success decreases exponentially with the prescribed weight, the most di cult case arising for values close to the Gilbert-Varshamov bound.
In order to encapture the notion of hardness that was just described, we make the following de nition, where M(p q) denotes the set of binary matrices with p rows and q columns::
De nition 2 Let , be in (0; 1); The SD( ; ) collection is the set of functions ff n g such that:
D n = f(M; x)jM 2 M(b nc n); x 2 f0; 1g n ; w H (x) = b ncg f n : (M; x) 7 ?! (M; M x)
With this de nition, we can formally state the intractability assumption on which the identi cation scheme proposed in this paper is built. It expresses the hardness of what we call the Syndrome Decoding problem.
Intractability assumption Let be in (0; 1). Then, for all such that 0 < < 1=2 and H 2 ( ) < , the SD( ; ) collection of functions is strongly one-way.
As was already pointed out, the above intractability assumption does not tell much about the choice of actual parameters that guarantee that the concrete problem of nding short codewords is beyond the limits of current computing technology. A survey of known algorithms for solving this problem appears in 6] with a discussion of their possible implementations and of their actual performances. We refer the reader to this paper and we only brie y comment on some gures taken from 6], for the case = 1=2. When n = 256 and m = 128 nding a word of weight close to 30 from its syndrome is possible and takes a few hours on a workstation. On the other hand, if we set n = 512, m = 256 and look for a word of weight 56, the workfactor for the search based on the best algorithm can be estimated as 2 70 . Even if it is di cult to make exact comparisons, it seems that this involves a computing e ort similar to what might be needed for factoring a 512 bit integer. Obviously, larger dimensions yield better security.
2 The identi cation scheme
Description of the scheme
The purpose of the scheme is to allow the identi cation of users in a system run by a central trusted authority. The proposed scheme uses a xed (m n)-matrix H over the two-element eld. This matrix is common to all users and is originally built randomly by the authority. Ideally, this means that each bit of the matrix is chosen uniformly and independantly, even if practicality may impose the use of some form of pseudo-random bit generator, as will be discussed later. H is used as a parity-check matrix and, as observed in the previous section, it provides a linear binary code with a good correcting power.
Upon registration, each user U receives a secret key s U , chosen at random by the authority among all n-bit words with a prescribed number p of 1's. This prescribed number p is also part of the system. The public identi cation of the user is computed as i U = H:s U This public identi cation is made available in some form of directory or is certi ed by means of a digital signature of the authority. It may further be linked to the actual identity of the user. This allows a registered participant who wants to access a given ressource to submit his public identity in order to undertake an identi cation session. Once the correctness of the public identity has been checked by the entity controlling the ressource, either through the directory or by means of the certi cate, the interactive identi cation protocol can take place.
The identi cation scheme relies on the notion of a commitment. A commitment is an electronic way to temporarily hide a sequence of bits u that cannot be changed. It is actually a two-stage process: a commit stage and a decommit stage. In the commit phase, the user transmits the image hui of u via some public cryptographic hash function. Later, during the decommit phase, the user simply reveals the value of u and the computation of hui can be checked. Commitments are usually achieved by hash functions. This is a standard cryptographic tool and, from a practical point of view, several hash functions such that MD5 (see 30]) or SHA (see 31]) can be used. The usual property required for hash functions is collision-freeness: it should be impossible to forge di erent sequence of bits u and v such that hui = hvi. The existence of collision-free hash functions is a widely believed assumption and can be suitably stated in the context of complexity theory by considering a collision free family, since the hash function depends not only on its input u, but also on the security parameter n. Note that the image of u by a collision-free hash function binds the value of u by preventing the user to announce another string v at the decommit stage. Still, it does not ensure the stronger property that no partial information on the committed string u can be recovered. A drastic way to ensure this property is to model the commit function hui by a truly random function. This hypothesis has already been used by various authors and is nicely developed in 4]. The underlying complexity-theoretic model is the Turing machine with random oracle. Another possibility is to add randomness to the hash function: instead of computing the image of u by a collision-free hash function h, one computes the image of jj u, where is a randomly chosen string with the same length as u and where jj denotes concatenation. We will call this technique random hashing.
We now describe the basic interactive protocol that enables any user U (which we call the prover) to identify himself to another entity (which we call the veri er). The protocol includes r rounds, each of these being performed as follows:
1. The prover picks a random n-bit word y together with a random permutation of the integers f1 ng and sends commitments c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 respectively as c 1 = h jjH(y)i c 2 = hy: i c 3 = h(y s U ): i to the veri er. A permutation is being considered in this setting as a vector of bits which encodes it; also note that y: refers to the image of y under permutation .
2. The veri er sends a random element b of f0; 1; 2g.
3. If b is 0, then, the prover returns y and . If b is 1 then, the prover reveals y s and . Finally, if b equals 2, then the prover discloses both y: and s U : .
4. If b equals 0, the veri er checks that commitments c 1 and c 2 , which were made in step 1, have been computed honestly. More accurately, letỹ and~ be the answers received from the prover at step 3, then the equations to check are as follows: Denoting byỹ ands the answers received at step 3, this corresponds to verifying that w H (s) has the prescribed value p and that the following equations hold c 2 = hỹi c 3 = hỹ si It should be understood that the description that was just given refers to the case when commitments are simply achieved by hashing. When random hashing is used as explained above, then each commitment c j , j = 1; 2; 3 uses a random string j , j = 1; 2; 3.
Step 3 should then be replaced by the following If b is 0, then the prover returns y, and 1 , 2 . If b is 1, then the prover reveals y s, and 1 , 3 . Finally, if b equals 2, then, the prover discloses y: , s U : and 2 , 3 .
Obvious changes are also needed in step 4, in order to properly decommit. The number r of consecutive rounds depends on the required level of security and will be discussed further on as well as the values of the parameters n; k; p.
Practical versions of the scheme
We rst brie y discuss security issues from an informal point of view. A more formal approach will be taken in the next section. Clearly, the security of the scheme relies on the di culty of inverting the function s ?! H(s) when its arguments are restricted to valid secret keys. Section 1 already gave some evidence of this di culty. In order to propose minimum size parameters, we note that any inversion algorithm solves the problem of nding a word of weight p in the code consisting of all words x such that H(x) is 0 or i. We next use the precise asymptotic evaluation of best algorithms computing codewords of small weight, recently given in 6] and con rmed by experiments in moderate sizes. This leads to the following possible sizes: n = 512; m = 256; p = 56 n = 768; m = 384; p = 84 n = 1024; m = 512; p = 110 These values correspond to codes with information rate 1=2. The value of p is slightly below the Gilbert-Varshamov bound. This is in accordance with the observations made in section 1. From the estimations of 6], the workfactor for the known algorithms that might reveal the secret is above O( k ) where is about 1:18 for the chosen values. For the minimum parameters quoted above, this yields a value close to 2 70 , which can be considered as unfeasible. Of course, larger parameters and trade-o s between the size of the code and its dimension can be considered. Also note that the parameters here are being chosen by considering only a time estimate for the most direct attack, namely nding a secret key s U from H and i U . This ignores the fact that, in the reduction of the security of the scheme to inverting H, which will be given in the next section, there may be some degradation of the security level and this could mean that larger parameters are advisable. This type of analysis has already been considered in section 1 and, as was noted there, is not speci c to the cryptographic scheme introduced in this paper. The only argument that we can o er is that we know of no other way to break the scheme than solving the underlying hard SD problem.
In order to counterfeit a given identity without knowing the secret key, various strategies can be used.
1. Having only y and ready for the veri er's query and replacing the unknown s U by some arbitrary vector t of weight p, for the computation of the various commitments. Thus, the false prover hopes that b is 0 or 2. In the rst case, he can simply disclose y and and in the second case, he returns y: and t: . On the other hand, he is unable to answer when b = 1 and, as a result, the probability of success is (2=3) r , where r is the number of rounds. 2. A similar strategy can be de ned with y s in place of y. In this case, the false prover hopes that b is 1 or 2 3. Having and both y and y t ready where t is some element such that H(t) = i, distinct from s U and whose weight is not p. This strategy expects that b is 0 or 1 and again yields the same probability of success. It is fairly clear that shifting between one strategy to another has also the same probability of success.
We close this section by various remarks related to the actual performances of our scheme.
1. It might be thought that the proposed scheme requires a large amount of memory. This is not accurate: on one hand, because the operations to perform are very simple, they can be implemented in hardware in a quite e cient way; on the other hand, if the scheme is implemented, partially or totally, in software, it is not neccessary to store all of H. One can only store words corresponding to some chosen locations and extend these by a xed software random number generator. Step 4 has also to be modi ed accordingly. The trick saves 128 bits per round and the resulting communication complexity is close to 900 bits on average. 3. The security of the scheme can be increased by taking n, k and p larger. The gures n = 512, k = 256 are to be considered as a minimum. 4. The heaviest part of the computing load of the prover (which is usually a portable device with a limited computing power) is the computation of H(y), which is done in step 1. This load can be drastically reduced by extending the protocol to a 5-pass version which will be discussed further on in this paper. 5. Considering that the probability of any cheating strategy is bounded above by (2=3) r , where r is the number of rounds, we see that the basic protocol has to be repeated 35 times in order to achieve a level of security of 10 ?6 . A key di erence between the proposed schemes and previous proposals is the fact that a single round o ers only security 1=3 instead of 1=2. There is a variant of our protocol that achieves security 1=2. It will be discussed further on in this paper 6. As is the case for Shamir's PKP, our scheme is not identity based. This means that public keys necessarily have to be made available by means of a directory or that they have to be certi ed by the issuing authority. We will consider below a variant of this scheme with an identity-based character. 7. Following 11], our identi cation scheme can be turned into a signature scheme as follows: prepare r commitments c j 1 ; c j 2 ; c j 3 , j = 1; r according to the instructions for step 1 and hash them together with the message m use the prepared commitments for step 1 and replace the veri er queries at step 2 using the successive digits of the hash value computed above in a base-3 representation compute the answers at step 3 as prescribed issue the transcript of all communications sent during the r steps as the signature of m Note that the quantity (3=2) r now represents the workfactor needed to forge a signature: the attacker can try (3=2) r variants c i until, by trial and error, he nds one whose hash value provides questions that he is prepared to answer. Accordingly, a larger value of r is required , say r 120, in order to make the attack unfeasible. This leads to rather long signatures. Still, if suitably optimized, the technique might prove useful in speci c scenarios, since veri cation is quite fast.
Comparison with other schemes
We now undertake a comparison with known zero-knowledge protocols. This is not an easy task especially if we want to address practicality: e ciency is actually dependant on the type of platform on which the protocols are implemented and on the degree of optimization of the software. Since we have not done large scale experiments with the numerous known schemes, we will restrict ourselves to a few remarks. Several parameters are meaningful when comparing schemes: the time for identi cation (on the prover's side), the time for veri cation (on the veri er's side), the communication complexity, the key size and the security level. In order to keep the discussion simple, we will ignore the latter by considering that the minimum proposed parameters for our scheme, namely n = 512; m = 256; p = 56 o er the same guarantee, as far as the underlying problem is concerned, as the number-theoretic analogues based on 512-bit numbers. We will also adjust the respective number of rounds so as to obtain a level of security of 10 ?6 . In the case of our scheme, this means 35 rounds.
Computing time. The various identi cation protocols can be organized in three groups.
The schemes by Guillou and Quisquater ( 17] ), Ohta and Okamoto ( 27] ), Schnorr ( 32] ), Okamoto ( 26] ) all use modular exponentiation modulo a large number n, both on the prover's side and on the veri er's side. It is worth noting that, when n is 512 bits, this operation requires 768 modular multiplications on average and leads to signi cant computing time even on large machines: for example, on a SUN SPARC 10, about 70 milliseconds are needed for the prover and 120 milliseconds for the veri er. In a very limited computing environment, such as the one provided by smart cards, the operation simply cannot be performed unless some speci c arithmetical co-processor is added. With such a device on board, 768 modular multiplications are done in approximately 500 milliseconds. The schemes proposed in 11, 9] and usually called the Fiat-Shamir schemes, only use modular multiplication. They are based on one or several secret keys, whose respective square modulo some xed large number n is public. When a single key is
are used, the number of multiplications in each round increases but the number of rounds simultaneously decreases: with ve keys and the same security level of 10 ?6 , only 14 multiplications are needed on average. The scheme proposed by Shamir in 24] and known as the PKP scheme, from the underlying \permuted kernel problem", on which it relies and the present scheme are quite similar in performances. Both can be implemented on a standard smart card with no arithmetical co-processor. In the case of our scheme, an implementation has been done on an SGS Thomson ST16623 card with 224 bytes of RAM, of which 140 bytes only are used for SD. One round is computed by the card in 800 ms.
Communication complexity. Clearly, the protocol proposed in the present paper cannot compete with the various schemes using modular exponentiation and mentioned above. These schemes can usually be performed in a single round, even if this is at the cost of formally losing the zero-knowledge character that will be discussed in the next section. This means that the overall communication stays in the kilobit range. The same is true for the Fiat-Shamir scheme with a large number of keys. For the single key case, the communication of each round is close to 1000 bits, which is very comparable to what we have. The gures for PKP are similar so that these protocols only di er by the number of rounds needed.
Key size. In number theoretic protocols, the key length is usually of the same size as the modulus n. This means 512 bits in the context that we discuss. It is higher for the multiple key Fiat-Shamir scheme, since each key has to be stored. On the other hand, some algorithms based on the discrete logarithm problem may have a shorter secret key: for example, in the Schnorr scheme, the secret key can be made as small as, say, 140 to 160 bits. In our proposal, the public key is 256 bits and the secret key is a vector of 512 bits with hamming weight 56. The latter can be coded as a word of 512 bits but more compact encodings, close to 256 bits, are also possible, for example by suitably decribing the successive gaps between the one's locations. The key size for PKP is similar. It is interesting to note that smaller key sizes are possible as demonstrated by a recent result of the author (see 36])
From the above discussion, we see that the identiti cation scheme presented in this paper will presumably appear attractive in severely limited computing environments such as those o ered by smart cards. In this setting, it might be easier to implement than the singlekey Fiat-Shamir protocol or the PKP scheme, that have similar performances. The slightly larger number of rounds could be an acceptable overhead in situations when identi cation is executed as a background task, access to the ressource being granted beforehand, on a provisional basis.
3 The zero-knowledge property Following 9] , the security of identi cation schemes is based on three properties:
The completeness property asserts that the execution of the protocol between a prover who has the correct secret and a veri er is successful with overwhelming probability.
The soundness property encaptures the notion of knowledge: in an identi cation protocol, the (secret) knowledge of the prover is demonstrated by the interaction. This means that any machine which successfully performs identi cation, can be suitably \modi ed" so that it outputs a possible secret key. This goes through the use of a knowledge extractor, which is given the prover's program and may run it as a subroutine in order to nally extract the secret key. In practical terms, this has the consequence that an intruder who has not been given a secret key, cannot identify himself as a regular user, provided that the computation of the secret key from the matching public key is actually hard.
The zero-knowledge property, also called the simulation property guarantees that the execution of the protocol does not leak any information on the secret key, even if the veri er is replaced by a another machine with a somehow biased strategy aiming at extracting data from the prover. This goes through the construction of a simulator, i.e. a machine which recreates (at least statistically) the communication between the prover and the veri er without being given access to the secret key. In practical term, zero-knowledge ensures that repeated executions of the protocol do not provide any kind of useful information that might help an intruder to misrepresent himself as a regular user. We now turn to formal proofs of security. This is in the framework of complexity theory. The arguments in this section will follow those in 9] and we will also use similar notations. Secret keys and public keys are related by a xed polynomial-time predicate. Users are polynomial-time probabilistic Turing machines with a special tape, called the knowledge tape, on which they store their secret key. To remain consistent with our previous notations, we call them provers. Veri ers are also polynomial time probabilistic machines. Interaction is modelled by having the prover and the veri er share their input tape as well as another tape called the communication tape on which they alternately write up the messages that they broadcast to each other. Interaction ends up when the veri er enters a nal state outputting one bit indicating the decision to accept or reject.
Our scheme can actually be described within this framework: the overall system in which identi cation is performed is modelled by a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which, on input n, produces a random parity check matrix H of size b nc n. Here is a xed parameter, which has been set to 1=2 in the practical examples given above. The algorithm also produces, on request, at most polynomially many secret key-public key pairs (s; i). These keys are such that H(s) = i and s has weight p = b nc, being another xed parameter < 1=2 with H 2 ( ) < or equivalently < GV (1 ? ). The protocol of section 1 is interactively executed between a prover P with public key i and a veri er V , both having the common input (H; i). Although several users are around, we will focus on the security of the identi cation scheme where, at any time, there is only one protocol executing. We will successively consider the three relevant properties (completeness, soundness and simulation) and, for each one, we will recall the formal de nition before entering the proofs.
Completeness
Consider an interactive protocol based on a polynomial-time predicate (I; S) and executed by a prover P and a veri er V on the common input I. Let ACC(P; V; I) denote the veri er's decision, where 1 stands for acceptance. Completeness asserts that, when P is given on its knowledge tape an S such that (I; S) holds, then V accepts with overwhelming probability. More formally, 8c 9n 8I (jIj > n ! PrfACC(P; V; I)g > 1 ? jIj ?c )
In our scheme, the input I is the pair (H; i) and the polynomial-time predicate consists of the two relations H(s) = i and w H (s) = p. It is easily seen that, when the prover is given the appropriate s, ACC(P; V; I) is always one.
Soundness
The formal de nition of soundness is quite intricate. Furthermore several variants have been considered in the recent literature. The de nition presented in 9] refers to the situation where the prover is a probabilistic polynomial-time machine with access to a knowledge tape. The knowledge extractor is given the prover's program and the auxiliary input contained on the knowledge tape. The starting hypothesis for using the extractor is the assumption that the prover has a non negligible probability I ?c of convincing the veri er on some input I, formally:
PrfACC(P; V; I)g > jIj ?c
The conclusion is that the extractor outputs with overwhelming probability an S such that (I; S) holds. Note that the extractor is dependant on the constant c. The de nition from 10] is di erent in that the extractor runs in expected polynomial time rather than polynomial time but treats provers more uniformly: for any given a and large enough I, it outputs an S such that (I; S) holds, with probability > PrfACC(P; V; I)g?jIj ?a . Another de nition appears in 3]. It also treats the prover uniformly but allows a knowledge error to appear in the success probability for the extractor: namely, the extractor outputs an S such that (I; S) holds, within an expected number of steps bounded by jIj c PrfACC(P; V; I)g ? (jIj) This de nition allows to prove soundness for a single round of an iterative protocol: for example the knowledge error of our scheme with r = 1 is 2=3.
We feel that the subtleties involved in the various de nitions of soundness will only be of interest to the zero-knowledge experts and we do not go further on this topic referring to 9, 10, 3] for more information. We will take a much simpler path here by only considering the case of a polynomial time probabilistic machineP which operates with an empty knowledge tape, i.e. without the secret. Assuming that such a machine has a nonnegligible probability of success, we will build another machine outputting, with overwhelming probability a solution s of the equation H(s) = i, with the prescribed weight. We call such a solution an acceptable key. As above, nonnegligible means bounded from below by the inverse of a polynomial in n. Observe that the existence of a machine outputting acceptable keys contradicts our intractability assumption SD( ; ). Thus, our approach already provides a strong argument towards the security of our scheme. Furthermore, the reader familiar with 9, 10, 3] will easily translate our statements into the respective formalism of these papers. In order to carry the proofs through, we will make use of a property of the family of hash functions we use, namely collision freeness. We rst give a formal version of the security bounds stated in section 2.
Theorem 1 Assume that some probabilistic polynomial-time adversaryP is accepted with probability (2=3) r + , > 0, after playing a constant number r of rounds of the identication protocol. Then there exists a polynomial-time probabilistic machine which outputs an acceptable key s from the public data or else nds collisions for the hash function, with overwhelming probability.
Proof Consider the tree T(!) of all 3 r executions corresponding to all possible questions of the veri er when the adversary has a xed random tape !. Let = PrfT(!)has a vertex with 3 sons g where the probability is taken over !. If is < , then it is easily seen that the probability of success of the adversary is bounded by (2=3) r + : (2=3) r comes from the case where T(!) has no vertex with 3 sons and from the other case. Thus is at least and by resetting the adversary 1= times, one nds, with constant probability, an execution tree T(!) with a vertex having 3 sons. Repeating again, the probability can be made very close to one. we conclude that either a collision for the hash function has been found or else that 0 = 1 and H(y 0 ) = H(w 1 ) i. Similar arguments show that, unless a collision has been found, z 2 = y 0 : 0 and z 2 t 2 = w 1 : 1 . We note that, since the third answer is accepted, t 2 has the prescribed weight. Writing in place of 0 = 1 , we get t 2 = z 2 (t 2 z 2 ) = (y 0 w 1 ): so that y 0 w 1 also has the prescribed weight. Now, H(y 0 w 1 ) = H(y 0 ) H(w 1 ) = i and we conclude that y 0 w 1 is an acceptable key.
The drawback of the algorithm described in the above proof is that the computing time is exponential in r: one can nd an acceptable key with constant probability only by running the adversary 1= times for randomly chosen ! and exploring each time the full execution tree T(!) for all possible queries of the veri er. We now describe a more e cient way of using the adversary.
1. randomly select the content ! of the random tape ofP . This de nes an execution tree T(!). 2. randomly select a sequence for the veri er's queries. This de nes a branch b of T(!). 3 . visit all vertices along branch b. If a vertex of T(!) with three sons is found at level i, then output !; b; i, else return to step 1
Lemma 1 Under the hypotheses of theorem 1, the probability of success of each step of the improved algorithm is bounded from below by 3 =10. Consider the set X de ned by X = f!jT(!)has at least 2 r + 2 3 r branches g
We claim that X has probability at least =2. Otherwise, we can bound the overall probability of success of the adversaryP by distinguishing the case ! 2 X and the case ! = 2 X. The rst case contributes by at most =2 and the second by ( 2 3 ) r + =2 and taking the sum yields a contradiction. Now, when ! is in X, we can consider the subtree of T(!) consisting of successful executions. Since ! 2 X, this subtree has at least 2 r + 2 3 r branches. For any index i, 0 i r we let n i denote the number of vertices at level i and for 0 i < r, we set i = n i+1 =n i . We have r?1 Y i=0 i 2 r + 2 3 r Taking logarithms, this yields r?1 X i=0 log( i ) log(2 r + 2 3 r ) log((1 ? 2 )2 r + 2 3 r ) Using a convexity inequality, this is (1 ? 2 )r + 2 r log 3 Hence one of the log( i )s has to exceed 1 + 2 (log 3 ? 1), which implies i 2:2 2 (log 3?1) 2 + ln 2(log 3 ? 1)
Now, if we let n i2 and n i3 respectively denote the number of vertices of T(!) with at most two sons and with three sons, we get i 2n i2 + 3n i3 n i2 + n i3 = 2 + n i3 n i and this shows that the proportion of vertices with 3 sons at level i is larger than ln 2(log 3? 1). Putting together the inequalities we see that we get ! 2 X with probability =2
we then get a successful branch b with (conditional) probability (2=3) r + =2 we nally get a vertex with three nodes with (conditional) probability ln 2(log 3?1) Taking the product, we get the lower bound ln 2(log 3?1) 4 ( ) 3 which is 1 10 3 Together with the proof of theorem 1 the probabilistic estimates given by the lemma show that repeating the basic step 10=( ) 3 times reveals an acceptable key with constant probability ' 1 ? 1=e.
It should be noted that, lemma 1 actually provides some concrete security estimates: assume for example that we aim at a security level which is and that we are concerned with an attacker which performs a huge preprocessing step with running time T and has a subsequent small running time t during the interaction. This is a reasonable scenario since we are dealing with identi cation: there could be a time-out device for bounding t. Now, using the attacker repeatedly, we nd an acceptable key in time T + 10t 3 . This can be compared with the time needed to attack the SD problem by the best known algorithms (see 6]). The gures should be convincing enough for codes of size 1024 although they cannot really justify the smaller parameter size that we suggest. But the same is true of all proofs that support various number-theoretic schemes from the literature.
Lemma 1 can be read as proving soundness with knowledge error (2=3) r in the sense of 3]. The following result achieves soundness in the sense of 9], provided that the number of rounds is not too small. Theorem 2 Assume that some probabilistic polynomial time adversaryP is accepted with non negligible probability after playing a number of rounds r(n) of the identi cation protocol that is such that log(n) = o(r(n)). Assume further that the hash function is collision free.
Then there exists a polynomial-time probabilistic machine which outputs an acceptable key from the public data with overwhelming probability.
Proof We use the above lemma. If (n) is the probability of success ofP, then, since log n is an o(r), we have, for n large enough (2=3) r < (n) 2 . Setting = (n) 2 and observing that 10=( ) 3 is polynomially bounded, we see that a vertex with three sons will be found with overwhelming probability by operatingP only a polynomial number of times.
Remark. The hypothesis on the hash function is really needed. In 13], Marc Girault and the author have shown that, if collisions can be e ciently produced, then very dangerous attacks against the scheme can be mounted. In more practical terms, this has the consequence that 64-bit hash values cannot be considered.
The simulation property
We now turn to the zero-knowledge aspect of the protocol. As explained above, this property guarantees that the execution of the protocol does not leak any information on the secret key, even if the veri er is replaced by another machineṼ with a somehow biased strategy aiming at extracting data from the prover. Following 9], we give a more precise de nition:
De nition 3 An interactive protocol between two polynomial-time machines P and V is zero-knowledge if, for every polynomial time machineṼ , there exists a machine S which generates, in expected polynomial time, an output having the same probability distribution as the content of the communication tape produced during the interaction of P andṼ . The expert reader will observe that the de nition just given only describes a speci c form of zero-knowledge, usually called perfect zero-knowledge. Other related de nitions exist: statistical zero-knowledge is concerned with the situation where the simulated distribution S n is indistinguishable from the original distribution D n , which means 8c 9n 8I 8X (jIj > n ! PrfS jIj (X) ? D jIj (X)g < jIj ?c )
Computational zero-knowledge applies to the case when the two distributions cannot be distinguished (in the same asymptotic sense) by a polynomial-time machine outputting one bit, usually called a polynomial-time test. Thus, we need to build a simulator, i.e. a machine S(Ṽ ), which recreates the communication betweenṼ and P in expected polynomial-time. This uses the idea of resettable simulation from 16]: at the beginning of each round the simulator chooses at random one of the three cheating strategies described in section 2.2 and prepares the initial commitments c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 according to the chosen strategy. Now, each strategy allows to successfully answer two of the three challenges issued byṼ . In caseṼ asks the wrong question, the simulator resets the machine for the current round. The simulator clearly runs in expected polynomial time 3r 2 . The main technical di culty of the proof comes from the hash function: since the inputs for the commitments c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 come from related data, it appears di cult to claim that they will be indistinguishable from those created by the cheating strategy, at least without any further assumption. A way to circumvent this di culty is to assume that the hash function is actually a random function. This hypothesis has already been used in 11] and is nicely developed in 4]. The underlying complexity-theoretic model is the Turing machine with random oracle: both P and V are probabilistic oracle Turing machines, the oracle providing, upon request, speci c values for the hash function. Success probabilities are taken over the random choices of the di erent machines and over the oracle. As pointed out in 4], the simulator has to include a simulation of the oracle, which may appear di cult since the oracle is an in nite object. The solution proposed in 4] is to allow the simulator to prescribe a small (polynomial-time) piece of the oracle and have the rest lled at random. We thus get a proof of the following. Theorem 3 In the random oracle model, the SD protocol is zero-knowledge.
Note that the oracle zero-knowledge de nition of 4] is primarily used to show that the corresponding model allows to do zero-knowledge proofs in one round, which is impossible in the usual model. We use the random oracle setting in a di erent way since it models a further property of cryptographic hash functions (besides collision-freeness). Such a property seems to be needed to perform the simulation of identi cation protocols which use hashing, such as SD or the PKP scheme from 24]. Since the latter does not include proofs, we can only suspect that it had the same setting in mind. In the case of SD, there is another option to prove zero-knowledge: it consists in modifying the commitment step by using random hashing, as explained in section 2. Recall that this simply involves changing hxi into h jj xi, where is a randomly chosen string with the same length as x. Theorem 4 When random hashing is used, the SD protocol is zero-knowledge.
In view of the proof of theorem 3, it is enough to show that the commitments c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 follow the same distribution when they come from a legitimate user P and when they are produced by any of the three cheating strategies. We only analyze the rst strategy and leave the two remaining cases to the reader. It consists in choosing y and at random and replacing the unknown s U by some arbitrary vector t of weight p. Commitments is a permutation of the underlying probability space which tranforms the commitments c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 into the corresponding commitments generated by the legitimate user. This is enough to conclude that both distributions of commitments are alike and to complete the proof of theorem 4.
Variants of the scheme
We now close up the theoretical evaluation of our scheme and discuss several variants at a practically oriented level, i.e. without formal proofs.
A variant which minimizes the computing load
In order to minimize the computing load, we introduce a 5-pass variant. This variant depends on a new parameter q.
Step 1 is the same except that commitment c 1 is replaced by h i. Thus H(y) is not computed at this stage.
After step 1, the veri er sends back a choice of q indices from f1 mg (these refer to a choice of q rows of the matrix H). The prover answers by sending the list of bits b 1 ; ; b q corresponding to the selected indices of the vector H(y). This consitutes a kind of partial commitment for H(y). The rest of the protocol is similar (with obvious changes for the checking step).
Of course this opens up new strategies for cheating: basically, one will try to have both y and y t ready where t is some element of weight p such that H(t) di ers from i on a small number of bits, say h. This will increase the probability of success by an amount which is close to 1 3 (1 ? h k ) q . In the case n = 512, m = 256, p = 56, q = 64, h = 15, this extra amount is roughly 0.007 and the loss can be compensated by adding only one extra round of the protocol.
Of course, the new strategy becomes more and more successful as h decreases; for example, making h = 4 and keeping all other gures unchanged increases the probability of cheating successfully to 0:78. But it can be shown that nding a t as above is equivalent to nding a word s 0 of weight at most p + h with a given syndrome H(s 0 ) = i and it is believed that, when h is very small, this remains unfeasable. Of course, many other trade-o s between n; k; p; h; q are possible.
A variant which minimizes the number of rounds.
In this variant, the secret key s is replaced by a simplex code generated by s 1 ; ; s v . Recall that a simplex code of dimension v has all its non zero codewords of weight 2 v?1 (see 22]).
It is easy to construct such a code with length 2 m ? 1 and to extend the length to any larger value n. The corresponding public key is the sequence H(s 1 ); ; H(s v ) .
It is unknown whether or not it is much easier to recover the family of secret vectors than to recover a single one. As a set of minimal values, we recommend v = 7 together with n = 576 and m = 288. This ensures consistency with our previous estimates.
We now describe one 5-pass round of a protocol that achieves identi cation. and sends z to the veri er 4. The veri er responds with a one bit challenge b. 5 . If b is 0, the prover reveals . If b is 1, the prover discloses y: as well as the full sequence s 1 : ; ; s v : . 6. If b equals 0, the veri er checks that commitment c 1 has been computed honestly.Note that H(y) can be recovered from H(z: ?1 ), the sequence of public keys and the binary vector issued at step 2. If b equals 1, the veri er checks that commitment c 2 was correct, that the computation of z is consistent and that s 1 ; ; s v actually form a simplex code of the required weight.
As before, this basic round can be repeated. Using arguments similar to those in section 3, it can be shown that the probability of success of a single round, when no information about the secret keys is known, cannot signi cantly excess
, which is essentially 1=2. On the other hand, it is clear that the communication complexity is worse than in the single-key case.
An identity based version
One attractive feature of the Fiat-Shamir scheme is that the public key can be derived from the user's identity, thus avoiding the need to link both by some signature from the issuing authority. Neither Shamir's PKP scheme nor our basic scheme have this feature. We now investigate various modi cations that can turn our scheme into an identity-based scheme. We note that our identity based versions are very sensitive to the possible disclosure of secret keys: for example, if several users pool their keys, then the overall system becomes weak. As a consequence these versions should be restricted to scenarios where the secret data are not available to the (physical) users. This is presumably the case if tamper-proof devices are used.
A rst possibility is to use a set of t simplex codes of dimension m. If s 1 ; ; s v is the rst of these codes, then m bits can de ne a speci c key v M j=1 b j s j and therefore, assuming that the identity of a user is given by tv bits, one can de ne t secret keys for each user. Now, these secret keys can be used randomly to perform identi cation. The veri er has to store tv vectors of k bits (the images of the basis vectors of the codes), which is much less than a full directory of users. We suggest v = 7 t = 6 as a reasonable implementation.
The other possibility that we describe is a bit more intricate and is more a suggestion for further research. It uses a \master code" consisting of 2t vectors s 1 ; ; s 2t whose one-bits only cover a subset T of the possible n locations. We assume that the identity Id U of each user is given by a balanced sequence of 2t bits e 1 ; ; e 2t , i.e. a sequence with t zeros and t ones. We let F(Id U ) be the vector space generated by those H(s j )'s such that e j = 1.
The public key i U of the user should satisfy i 2 F(Id U ). Key generation goes as follows: by Gaussian elimination, it is possible to nd a linear combination s U of the s j 's, e j = 1 whose weight p is slightly below jTj?t 2 . This is the secret key of the user, computed by the issuing authority.
The security of this variant is more di cult to analyze. Let F be the vector space generated by of all of the H(s j )'s and let C be the code consisting of all words x such that H(x) 2 F. Typically, it can be observed that C has a vector with a small number of ones located within the (unknown) set T. The dimensions should be designed in order that the weight of this vector is large enough. We suggest, as a working example, jTj = 272, t = 40, p = 112, n = 1024, m = 512. 20 5 Conclusion.
Before concluding the paper, we brie y mention another possible scheme that can be devised by replacing the f0; 1g-matrix H of SD by a matrix over a nite eld with an extremely small number q of elements (typically 3, 5 or 7). In this situation, the weight constraint is replaced by the constraint that the secret solution s to the equation H(s) = i consists entirely of zeros and ones. Thus the underlying di cult problem is a modular knapsack. Although it is known that knapsacks can be attacked by methods based on lattice reduction (see 21, 7] ), it is clear also that these methods do not apply to the modular case, at least when the modulus q is very small. Possible values for the scheme are (with the same notations as above) n = 196, m = 128, q = 3 n = 384, m = 256, q = 3 n = 128, m = 64, q = 5 n = 192, m = 96, q = 5 One round of the protocol is performed as follows:
1. The prover picks a random vector y with coe cients from the q-element eld, together with a random permutation of the integers f1 ng and sends commitments c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 respectively for h ; H(y)i, hy: i and h(y + s mod q): i. 2. The veri er sends a random element b of f0; 1; 2g.
3. If b is 0, the prover reveals y and . If b is 1, the prover reveals y + s mod q and .
Finally, if b equals 2, the prover discloses y: and s: . 4. The veri er makes the obvious checks. The above protocol seems to indicate that our scheme is not an isolated example but is related to a fairly general paradigm that produces identi cation protocols from hard combinatorial problems. Besides Shamir's PKP and the present SD, other proposals have been made that belong to the same family: one was put forward by Pointcheval (see 28]) using the so-called perceptron's problem; another one, due to the author ( 36] ), is based on the problem of solving linear equations modulo a small prime, the unknowns being subject to the condition that they belong to some prescribed subset. A speci c feature of the latter is that it achieves very small key-length both for the public and the secret key.
As a conclusion, let us repeat what we feel is the main achievement of the present paper: by de ning a new practical identi cation scheme based on the syndrome decoding problem (SD), which only uses very simple operations, we believe that we have widened the range of techniques that can be applied in crytography.
